Israel does not plan to withdraw its troops from the southern territories of Syria adjacent to the Golan Heights. How is it possible counter Turkey without respecting Russia’s interests?
Alexandr Svaranc
It seemed that Turkey, as a NATO member, would adopt balanced diplomacy in this situation, since Israel is a strategic ally of the United States in the Middle East. Moreover, Israeli technology has contributed to the development of the Turkish economy and defense industry. However, a month after the start of the conflict, Ankara’s position aligned itself in favour of Hamas.
Apart from its desire to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinians, Turkey did not intend to follow Iran’s example in providing Hamas with military support. At the same time, the trade embargo Ankara declared against Tel Aviv did not extend to the transit of Azerbaijani oil through Turkish territory to Israeli ports, which indirectly aided the IDF’s offensive operations in the Gaza Strip. In response, Israeli intelligence agencies refrained from carrying out punitive operations against Hamas operatives on Turkish soil.
Regardless of internal changes, Moscow considers the Syrian state and Syrian people as its partner
This situation could be explained by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s desire to strengthen Turkey’s role as a leading Islamic country, to aspire to a candidacy for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and to become a Middle Eastern leader. Ankara demonstrated the real potential of neo-Ottoman aspirations, given that Palestine was once part of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Turkish pragmatism ruled out providing specific military assistance to Hamas in its confrontation with Israel, as Turkey’s military actions are constrained by NATO and US policies (not to mention the presence of American military bases in Anatolia).
Meanwhile, Turkey has flexibly used its partnership with Russia in Syria, which since the autumn of 2016 has allowed it to conduct several local military operations to enter Kurdish-populated areas of the northern provinces of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) to establish a “security zone” 130 km long and 30 km deep, and to continue supporting pro-Turkish combat structures of Turkomans and Sunnis in the Syrian civil conflict (including the Sultan Murad Division and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham*).
Syria, under the rule of the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad, posed a threat to Israel’s interests as well. Damascus, in partnership with Tehran, allowed the Iranian side to transfer weapons through Syrian territory to Lebanon for the Shiite organization Hezbollah, which was used in attacks against the Jewish state in support of Hamas. This particular circumstance forced Israeli intelligence agencies to carry out subversive operations on Syrian territory against representatives of the IRGC, who coordinated the transit and managed Shiite militant groups. In turn, the Israeli Air Force conducted pinpoint strikes on Syrian military facilities and infrastructure.
For Ankara, which in the intra-Syrian civil conflict opposed the B. al-Assad regime due to its negative stance on the Qatari gas pipeline project to Turkey, everything Israel did against the Alawite regime in Damascus was beneficial at the time. However, after the IDF’s successful military operation in southern Lebanon and the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan realized that the Israelis would not limit themselves to Lebanon and would localise the threat in Syria. Conceding Syria to Israel could lead to a head-on collision with Turkey. That is why Erdoğan stated that a conflict with Israel in the future cannot be ruled out.
In an attempt to get ahead of events, Turkey in late November 2024 initiated, through the combat structures it controls in Syria, an offensive on Aleppo and Damascus, leading to the upheaval and the overthrow of the B. al-Assad regime in favour of the pro-Turkish Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham* leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani.
Israel did not recognize the new authorities in Damascus, occupied the “security zone” in southern Syria under the pretext of a crisis and the Syrian side’s inability to ensure international obligations regarding security in the Golan Heights area. The IDF continued targeted strikes on military facilities (arsenals) and infrastructure of the SAR to weaken the already “emaciated” military potential of the Syrian army, while Israeli diplomacy and intelligence began supporting the Druze ethnic factor in the south, threatening the Syrian state with separatism.
Thus, despite the US and Europe having established relations with Syria’s new leadership (with its head as interim Ahmed al-Sharaa), Israel continues to maintain an anti-Syrian position. Specifically, Tel Aviv is trying to legitimise the occupation of the Golan Heights, expand the “security zone” (or, for some, occupation zone) in the south of the SAR using the Druze factor, prevent the deployment of Turkish military bases in southern Syria (primarily air defense and aviation), and block the laying of the Qatari gas pipeline through Syria to Turkey.
Without Russia, Israel-Turkey Negotiations on the Syrian Crisis are Futile
Azerbaijan, whose military success in the second Karabakh war owes much to Israel and Turkey, is known to be extremely interested in improving relations between its two allies. Ilham Aliyev once again initiated covert Turkish-Israeli negotiations in Baku. However, meetings between the representatives of Tel Aviv and Ankara on the “Baku platform” have not yet led to a compromise solution. Israel remains opposed to the deployment of Turkish military bases in Syria.
The military conflict with Iran in June 2025 showed Turkey that the US and Israel confirm their military alliance on the battlefield as well. Therefore, Ankara pays particular attention to statements from Tel Aviv and Washington. Moreover, periodic financial crises in the Turkish economy and a shortage of foreign investment remind President R. Erdoğan that Turkey will find it difficult to overcome an “embargo” by the influential global Jewish diaspora and capital.
The ruling regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa in the SAR coordinates all its actions with external players with the Turkish Foreign Ministry, General Staff, and MIT.
Russia in December 2024 did not offer military resistance to pro-Turkish formations to retain the B. al-Assad regime. Regardless of internal changes, Moscow considers the Syrian state and Syrian people as its partner. Nevertheless, the ruling regime of any state defines the contours of national interests. Turkey, which has decisive influence over contemporary Damascus, is in no hurry to make its final decision on the fate of Russian bases.
The visit of Ahmed al-Sharaa to Moscow (October 2025) and the subsequent negotiations included a full package of issues regarding Russian-Syrian relations in its agenda. Damascus (obviously in coordination with Ankara) is ready to provide Russian energy companies with a share in the development of oil fields in the northern provinces of the SAR in exchange for Russia’s firm position on preserving the territorial integrity of the Syrian state.
Regarding the deployment of military bases, it is possible that al-Sharaa, considering the unproductiveness of Turkish-Israeli negotiations in Baku and following Ankara’s recommendations, proposed relocating the Russian Aerospace Forces air base to southern Syria to enable protection against Israel’s aggressive aspirations. To put it simply, Syria in the current situation is incapable of independently defending its sovereignty in case of an attack by the IDF, and Turkey fears a negative reaction from the US.
According to the agreements made in Egypt, Turkey intends to deploy its peacekeepers in the Gaza Strip and has prepared a corresponding unit. But Israel is drastically against the presence of Turks in Gaza, and this cannot serve as leverage to secure consent for Turkish bases in Syria.
It all begs the question: is it reasonable for Russia to benefit from the Syrian situation in Turkey’s interests, considering Ankara’s unfriendly actions in Libya and Karabakh? What are the potential consequences for Russia’s relations with Israel, its influential groups, and the US if it accepts the challenge in the Golan Heights area? Furthermore, it is significant to assess and evaluate the economic expediency of laying the Qatari gas pipeline through Syria and Turkey to the European market and its impact on the “Turkish Stream” project.
Meanwhile, as reported by The Times of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, speaking at a Knesset session on December 8, stated that Israel continues contacts with another world power – Russia and its president V. Putin, which “serves our vital interests.”
Russia, according to the Israeli Prime Minister, is part of a group of powers including the US, India, and Germany, with which Tel Aviv maintains strong contacts on this topic. In other words, Netanyahu is making it clear to Turkey and Syria that attempts to draw Russia into a conflict with Israel are futile. The link with India and Germany hints at the prospect of implementing a transit project to form an international transport corridor for supplying Indian goods through Arab Eastern countries and Israel to Europe under the security guarantees of the US and Russia.
Hence, Russia’s role was and still remains important in world affairs, and its interests should be respected regardless of the geography of the globe.
*The organization is recognised as terrorist and extremist, banned in the Russian Federation.
Alexander SVARANTS – PhD in Political Sciences, Professor, Expert on Middle Eastern Countries.
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