As the US-Israeli war on Iran reshapes regional alignments, uneasy allies like Abu Dhabi and Islamabad are sliding into open confrontation over loyalty, leverage, and survival.
The Cradle
Over the past year, relations between Abu Dhabi and Islamabad have steadily frayed. But the rupture accelerated once the US–Israeli assault on Iran began, followed by a sudden Emirati demand that Pakistan repay a $3.5-billion loan dating back to 2018.
Abu Dhabi has publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s recent role in attempting to mediate between Tehran and Washington and bring about an already violated ceasefire. Yet behind closed doors, it has refused to identify the aggressors driving the conflict and the resulting global economic shock. This selective silence reflects a broader alignment with US priorities, even as it risks destabilizing its own regional partnerships.
The divergence came to a head during a strategic consultation in Riyadh on 19 March. The meeting nearly collapsed after the UAE, alongside Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain, blocked Pakistan’s push to include a condemnation of Israeli aggression. Instead, Abu Dhabi advanced a far more extreme position – advocating the defeat of Iran “by any means necessary,” while avoiding any criticism of Washington or Tel Aviv.
According to Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, writing in the Urdu-language newspaper Jhang, Emirati officials went as far as suggesting the potential use of nuclear weapons against Iran. Lebanon, Turkiye, and Pakistan pushed back forcefully, warning that any such escalation would not stop at Iran’s borders but would inevitably engulf the Persian Gulf monarchies themselves.
Only after last-minute Saudi intervention was the final communiqué amended to include language condemning Israeli aggression.
Mediation or managed pressure?
Pakistan, alongside Turkiye and Egypt, has stepped forward as part of a loose mediation track aimed at halting the war. All three states maintain ties to Washington, yet attempt to position themselves as intermediaries capable of delivering a ceasefire acceptable to Tehran.
Islamabad’s proposal outlined a two-phase plan. The first calls for an immediate ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The second envisions a broader settlement – dubbed the “Islamabad Accord” – spanning 15 to 20 days of negotiations, during which Iran would limit its nuclear program to civilian use in exchange for sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, and a new regional security framework for Hormuz.
Tehran has rejected this framework outright.
On 6 April, Iranian officials reiterated that any temporary arrangement without binding guarantees would only invite renewed aggression. Tehran insists on a permanent ceasefire backed by enforceable assurances that the US and Israel will not resume hostilities.
It has also rejected external pressure to reopen the Strait of Hormuz under wartime conditions, maintaining that control of the strategic waterway remains a sovereign security lever.
Despite this, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan, Reza Amiri Moghadam, described Islamabad’s efforts on X as entering a “crucial and delicate phase.” The diplomatic language masks a deeper reality – Tehran sees mediation attempts less as neutral initiatives and more as instruments of pressure designed to extract concessions without addressing its core security concerns.
Pakistani analysts share this skepticism. Many view the push for mediation as an attempt by Washington and its regional partners to engineer a temporary pause that restores shipping flows without fundamentally altering the balance of power.
Sajjad Azhar, an Islamabad-based analyst, tells The Cradle that the absence of credible guarantors renders any agreement fragile from the outset:
“I doubt that Pakistan’s efforts can bring any peace to the region, because whenever a peace proposal comes over, the issue concerning guarantees leads to an unsuccessful outcome. In this conflict, no third country seems ready to guarantee it, so any hope of establishing peace is very dim.”
Beijing’s calibrated distance
China has entered the diplomatic arena cautiously, coordinating with Pakistan on a five-point proposal unveiled during a 31 March meeting in Beijing. The framework emphasizes adherence to the UN Charter, multilateralism, and the construction of a long-term political settlement rooted in international law.
Yet Beijing’s posture remains deliberately restrained.
Taiwan-based researcher and author, Dr Ghulam Ali, explains to The Cradle that China is unwilling to translate its strategic partnership with Iran into direct confrontation with the US:
“China's reaction to the US-Israel actions against Iran has highlighted the boundaries of its engagement – Beijing is inclined to refrain from direct involvement in conflicts, even when they pertain to its partners. The situation was directly shaped by China's interests, with Iran serving as a strategic partner as outlined in the 2021 agreement.”
He claims that Beijing was expected to limit its involvement to diplomatic efforts and verbal commitments, refraining from any overly active participation or assurances regarding the protection of this agreement.
This reflects a broader Eurasian calculation – support Iran politically, avoid escalation militarily, and preserve long-term connectivity projects that depend on regional stability.
Trump’s deadline politics
US President Donald Trump escalated pressure by warning that Iran could be “taken out” if it failed to reach an agreement by 8 April. Tehran rejected the ultimatum, reiterating that any settlement must end the war entirely rather than suspend it temporarily.
In a parallel move, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif requested a two-week extension to facilitate negotiations and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
Surprisingly, President Trump promptly suspended the operation against Iran at the request of Islamabad, which raises suspicions that Sharif’s move was pre-planned in complicity with Trump and was a ploy to pressure Tehran into accepting the terms set by Washington.
Critics in Pakistan argue that Islamabad’s mediation may be less about neutrality and more about aligning with US objectives while maintaining the appearance of diplomatic independence.
Dr Ali says:
“The leadership in Pakistan is making efforts to align itself with the interests of Donald Trump to gain his favor. The present circumstances in Pakistan bear similarities to the 1970–71 era, during which the nation faced intensifying internal challenges while its leadership focused on an international mediating function, particularly regarding the China–US rapprochement. The current domestic crises in Pakistan, including political instability and economic challenges, exhibit similarities to previous situations that have historically hindered effective governance.”
Abu Dhabi hardens its line against Pakistan
The UAE–Pakistan rift predates the Iran war but has deepened under its pressure.
Tensions escalated earlier this year when Abu Dhabi withdrew from a deal to manage Islamabad airport, signaling declining confidence in bilateral economic cooperation. At the same time, the UAE has expanded ties with arch-rival India while tightening restrictions on Pakistani nationals, citing concerns over crime and irregular migration.
“The UAE and Saudi Arabia have tense relations with each other, and in these circumstances, when Pakistan signed a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia last year, the UAE got angry,” Azhar believes.
Azhar adds that from Pakistan’s perspective, the UAE is leaning toward India and has refused to extradite property tycoon Malik Riaz – facing criminal cases in Pakistan – and the Baloch separatist leadership.
Islamabad’s hidden imperatives
Pakistan’s push for mediation is not driven by altruism.
Dr Ali finds it perplexing that a nation on the brink of economic collapse, experiencing significant political fragmentation, holding the highest position on the Global Terrorism Index, and grappling with an escalating security crisis is simultaneously seeking engagement in the complexities of great power politics.
“Pakistan's diplomatic efforts seem to function as a strategic maneuver aimed at redirecting focus from pressing internal challenges,” Ali says.
Its security commitments to Saudi Arabia place it in a precarious position. Any direct Iranian strike on Saudi territory could trigger obligations that draw Pakistan into the conflict.
Azhar argues that Islamabad’s diplomacy is aimed at containing a war that could otherwise spill into its own borders:
“A broader conflict could also threaten Pakistan. If Iran attacks Saudi Arabia, Pakistan will be bound to defend it under the agreement, which means that defense includes not only protection but also the possibility of engaging in offensive actions. In this situation, the conflict could extend to Pakistan, and Pakistan is making efforts to prevent that from happening by engaging in diplomatic negotiations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia to de-escalate tensions.”
Power over the terms of de-escalation now defines the conflict. Washington and its regional partners are pushing for a pause that restores shipping flows and stabilizes markets. Tehran is holding out for guarantees that safeguard its national security and sovereignty and those of its allies. Neither side is moving.
Abu Dhabi has already chosen its lane, tightening alignment with Washington and Tel Aviv. Islamabad is trying to hedge, keeping diplomatic channels open with Tehran while coordinating with the US. The divergence is widening, and it cuts directly through what was once a functional partnership.
The UAE–Pakistan rift signals something larger taking shape across West Asia. Under pressure from Washington’s war, states are being forced into harder alignments, recalculating old ties, and bracing for a conflict that is steadily reshaping the region’s political order.
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