Beneath the surface of unity, Gulf royals are locked in a quiet contest for dominance – testing the limits of US oversight and reshaping alliances on their own terms.
The Cradle
The silent war between allies
Behind handshakes and photo ops, a cold war simmers between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. What began as a strategic alliance, rooted in personal camaraderie between Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), has morphed into a fierce rivalry for regional dominance in the vacuum left by Washington’s declining influence.
The Saudi–Qatari summit on 8 December came at an exceptional and sensitive time, coinciding with developments in Yemen, where Emirati-backed factions have defied Saudi influence and extended control in the south. Though officially framed as a routine coordination meeting, the summit signaled more with Riyadh recalibrating its Gulf strategy. The landmark outcome was a mutual defense agreement between the two nations – described as “unprecedented” since the 2017 Gulf crisis.
The fanfare surrounding the Riyadh–Doha high-speed rail project underscored this new alignment. Spanning 785 kilometers, the rail line departs from Riyadh, passing through Hofuf and Dammam, to reach Doha, and connects King Salman International Airport and Hamad International Airport, reaching speeds exceeding 300 kilometers per hour with a journey time not exceeding two hours.
Saudi media framed the project as an indication of the maturity of the relationship and its entry into a new strategic phase, “putting Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the center of a new equation of interdependence, not diplomatic courtesy.”
Observers read the summit as “a quiet announcement of a new phase of Gulf re-engineering” and a clear indication that the kingdom seeks to isolate Abu Dhabi from the Gulf by fostering new alliances and neutralizing any Emirati influence within the region.
Speaking to The Cradle, Saudi scholar Fouad Ibrahim believes that talk of a Saudi–Qatari rapprochement designed to counter Emirati influence is still premature, especially with contradictions between these countries, making any talk of constants in Gulf relations risky. Ibrahim points out that the Gulf has become accustomed to what he calls a “game of chairs” in regional politics, where alliances change rapidly according to interests.
He also highlights an ironic twist: the renewed Saudi–Qatari closeness may serve the interests of Jared Kushner, US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and former senior advisor, who played a key role in the 2017 blockade of Qatar following Doha’s refusal to bankroll Kushner’s property empire.
Proxy battles and shifting fronts
The rivalry has moved beyond diplomatic snubs to battlefield maneuvers. In Sudan, the UAE has backed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to secure maritime corridors and mineral wealth, jeopardizing Saudi ambitions in the Red Sea. Riyadh, seeking to reverse these gains, turned to Washington, prompting a direct appeal from MbS to Trump to help end the conflict.
In retaliation, Abu Dhabi escalated its campaign in Yemen, with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) seizing territories like Hadhramaut, traditionally within the Saudi sphere. While Riyadh responded cautiously – deploying envoys and shoring up military posts – the UAE pushed deeper, extending its grip over Al-Mahra, Aden, Shabwah, and other southern governorates.
To counter this encroachment, Saudi Arabia welcomed Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and received backing from Washington, whose Secretary of State Marco Rubio phoned Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed to affirm support for Riyadh and discourage the UAE’s unilateral actions in Yemen, while discussing mechanisms to advance the ceasefire in Sudan.
Old wounds, new battlefronts
Political scholar Hassan Elayan explains to The Cradle that the Saudi–Emirati rivalry has historical roots dating back to 1923, with ongoing disputes over territory and maritime boundaries. The most prominent milestone in the conflict was the 1974 Jeddah Agreement, which recognized some of the UAE's rights but refused to grant any share of the Sheyah oil field.
When Abu Dhabi asked for a review of the maps in 2004, Riyadh refused, which escalated to a ban on Emiratis entering the Kingdom in 2009 in protest at the request for remapping. The rivalry later extended to regional influence, he adds, taking advantage of its alliances with Israel and the US to strengthen its economic and military presence.
When the war broke out in 2011 in Syria, Saudi Arabia and the UAE began supporting armed groups, but their priorities have diverged as the conflict progressed.
The UAE preferred to maintain the stability of the then-government of Bashar al-Assad and avoid the rise of radical Islamist groups. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia adopted a hesitant stance until 2023, as it gradually re-normalized with Damascus after the Chinese-brokered Saudi–Iranian détente, influenced by the UAE's strategy and the reintegration of Syria into the Arab League.
In Yemen, the alliance fractured completely. Riyadh supports the Aden-based government to safeguard its border and strategic depth. The UAE, in contrast, backs the separatist STC to secure ports and curb the influence of Islah, which it sees as a Muslim Brotherhood proxy.
In Sudan, the split is equally stark: Abu Dhabi backs the RSF to entrench its Red Sea influence, while Riyadh aligns with the central government to safeguard its own geopolitical aims.
In essence, the UAE leans on armed proxies and control of ports; Saudi Arabia prefers pliable governments and diplomacy, aiming to manage crises without head-on conflict.
As Alayan notes, any rapprochement will be temporary and confined to specific issues. Big structural differences remain, shaped by diverging regional visions and dependency on Washington, which still holds sway over the GCC's internal dynamics.
The economic front: Oil and ambition
The competition now extends into strategic sectors. In 2009, the UAE exited the Gulf Central Bank project after Riyadh was chosen as its headquarters, derailing the single currency initiative and exposing growing Emirati unease with Saudi leadership.
Tensions flared again in 2021 during an OPEC+ standoff. The UAE rejected Saudi-led production cuts as inequitable, only backing down after securing an increased output quota. More recently, Riyadh launched a campaign to draw multinational firms to relocate their regional bases to the kingdom, issuing licences to dozens of international corporations and positioning itself as an emerging logistics hub rivaling Dubai.
The aviation sector, too, has become a new arena of rivalry. In 2023, Saudi Arabia launched a second national carrier, Riyadh Air, aimed squarely at competing with Emirates Airline, reflecting a broader ambition to dethrone the UAE as the Gulf’s economic center of gravity.
A rivalry of men
At its heart, this struggle is also personal. In 2015, MbZ saw in the then 29-year-old MbS an ambitious partner to realign Gulf power structures. He backed his rise to the crown prince post and cultivated ties with Washington. But the mentor-protégé dynamic soured as MbS asserted independent leadership and sought to eclipse his former benefactor.
Leaked US diplomatic cables revealed longstanding Emirati suspicion of Saudi intentions. In 2009, a cable cited Emirati officials describing Riyadh as a greater threat than Iran. By 2019, internal Emirati memos labeled MbS as impulsive and incompetent, particularly in his Yemen strategy. Documents also showed MbZ’s concerns about the impact of Saudi policies on regional stability and revealed his fear of Wahhabism and its possible internal and external influences.
In 2022, reports surfaced of the Saudi royal threatening to blockade the UAE – mirroring the 2017 siege of Qatar.
Two axes, one Gulf
Today, two competing blocs are crystallizing. The UAE, in close coordination with Tel Aviv, is reshaping trade and security dynamics in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. With Israeli backing, Abu Dhabi is building ports and trade routes designed to bypass traditional chokepoints, using its regional footprint as leverage.
In response, a tentative Riyadh–Doha axis is emerging – driven by shared concern over unchecked Emirati–Israeli expansion. This axis is reinforced by broader Saudi outreach: détente with Iran, dialogue with Syria and Turkiye, and strategic overtures to Pakistan. Though still fluid, this signals Riyadh’s desire to diversify alliances and reduce reliance on the Emirati partnership.
Alayan notes that while Saudi–Qatari ties have improved markedly – particularly since the GCC summit in Manama – relations with the UAE remain strained. He argues that although Riyadh and Doha may deepen cooperation, any full-blown alliance will be shaped by the limits imposed by Washington’s preferences and its centrality to Gulf security.
Managing the rupture
Despite sharp divergences, a complete Saudi–Emirati rupture remains unlikely – for now. The Persian Gulf is witnessing a managed competition: the UAE pushes forward, imposing facts on the ground; Saudi Arabia, with Qatari support, builds quiet counter-alliances.
All of this unfolds beneath the US umbrella, which continues to exploit intra-Gulf rivalries to maintain leverage in the region.
The Gulf order is no longer what it was, and Riyadh is no longer willing to play junior partner to Abu Dhabi's ambitions. As old assumptions collapse, new alignments are emerging with deliberate intent – less noisy than before, but no less consequential.
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