Rhetoric vs. reality: The Doha summit and the Gulf’s limits on confronting Israel

by Dr Mustafa Fetouri

Members of the press follow the summit from the media center set up in Doha, Qatar, where the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) – Arab League Extraordinary Summit is held to discuss Israel’s attack on Qatar, on September 15, 2025. [Erçin Ertürk – Anadolu Agency]

When representatives from nearly 60 Arab and Muslim countries gathered in Doha on 15 September 2025 for an Emergency Arab-Islamic Summit—hastily convened after Israel’s 9 September airstrike that targeted Hamas leaders during a meeting in the Qatari capital—observers recognised the urgency but expected little action. The bitter truth is that about one third of the countries present in Doha, including six Arab states, still maintain relations with Israel, yet they joined in condemning its actions and denouncing the Gaza genocide. The attack on Doha, they agreed, constitute a blatant violation of international law and an aggressive and unprovoked infringement of Qatar’s sovereignty. Despite such forceful condemnations, the summit did not go any further just like so many other summits before. No meaningful punitive measures were taken and none are expected.

This gap between language and policy—between anger on camera and restraint in practice—highlights two competing logics at work. On one hand, leaders feel compelled to display outrage to satisfy domestic publics and regional opinion. On the other, decades of security dependence, economic contracts, investment flows, and the fear of escalation make them reluctant to sever ties with Israel. In reality, many observers concluded that holding the summit without backing words with action was little different from not holding it at all.

Why criticise when you intend no action?

It was apparent that countries maintaining any form of ties with genocidal Israel lacked the political will to translate words into action. The three Arab states, excluding Sudan, which has yet to develop any ties with Israel—the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco—could at minimum have downgraded diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. In fact, they should have done so even before arriving at the summit, to show two things: that they are serious about supporting Qatar, and that they are aware that aggression against Qatar could extend to the Gulf more broadly if left unchecked. They could have gone further: suspending trade, freezing official communications, or kicking out Israeli diplomats.

Leveraging trade and economic exchange to influence policy is standard practice for countries both large and small. The UAE–Israel Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), for example, reduces or removes tariffs on 96 per cent of goods traded between them and ties businesses to joint government procurement contracts, giving the UAE levers it has not yet exercised if it is serious about punishing Israeli crimes. Freezing or revising aspects of the CEPA could send a strong signal of disapproval. Financial and investment pressure could entail: Freezing or divesting state funds, suspending Israeli investment in key sectors, or denying access to local procurement contracts as seen with UAE’s free-trade deal including government tenders.

Beyond economic levers, the Gulf’s leadership also signalled a military response. Through the GCC Supreme Council and its Joint Defence (Unified Military) Command, the bloc condemned the Israeli strike on Qatar, framing it as a direct threat to Gulf security. The council instructed the Joint Defence Command to assess and upgrade the region’s military posture, including enhanced intelligence sharing, early warning integration, and joint air exercises. Official GCC language stressed that “an attack on one is an attack on all” and called for urgent meetings of military committees. While these measures appear concrete on paper, they remain largely declarative, highlighting the persistent gap between formal commitments and the likelihood of tangible action.

But capability and political will are not the same. Past Gulf joint defence pronouncements have often produced intelligence coordination rather than an automatic military response. The Unified Military Command has been strengthened in recent years, yet its ability to deter or punish a state actor such as Israel depends on political consensus—which is difficult given divergent bilateral ties to Washington and Israel—logistics, and, crucially, the risk calculus of confronting a nuclear-armed US ally. In short, the GCC statement raises the rhetorical and planning stakes, but operationalising a genuine collective military deterrent would be slow, complex, and heavily constrained by member states’ relations with the United States.

Limits of political will vs. economic ties

While the GCC’s collective military posture remains largely declarative, Qatar wields influence far beyond its size. Hosting the largest US airbase in the region and maintaining massive investments in the United States—including, famously, a private jet gifted to Donald Trump—Doha occupies a strategically critical position, giving it leverage few other Gulf states enjoy. Yet the Qatari leadership chose not to push Washington toward a more forceful stance against Israel following the strike. The US did not even agree to a UN Security Council statement  condemning the attack on Doha unless it refrained from naming Israel—which ultimately happened. Instead, Qatar relied on its soft-power tools—diplomatic influence, mediation credibility, and hosting high-profile summits—carefully signalling displeasure without risking confrontation.

Qatar’s strategic leverage is underscored by its substantial investments in the United States. During President Trump’s visit in May 2025, Qatar committed to an economic exchange worth at least $1.2 trillion, encompassing defense sales, infrastructure investments, and a landmark aviation deal. This includes a $96 billion agreement for Qatar Airways to purchase up to 210 Boeing 777X and 787 jets, supporting over 154,000 US jobs annually Additionally, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), plans to at least double its annual US investments over the next decade, following a prior commitment to invest $500 billion in the US.

Despite this formidable leverage, Qatar refrained from pressuring the United States to adopt a more assertive stance against Israel following the 9 September airstrike. Instead, it relied on diplomatic channels and multilateral forums to express its discontent. This approach is reminiscent of remarks made by former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, who once stated that Gulf states “receive orders from the US and carry them out fully or partially without even questioning them.” This sentiment underscores the complex dynamics at play, where strategic alliances and economic considerations often temper overt political actions.

In the end, the Emergency Arab-Islamic Summit in Doha highlighted a persistent contradiction: countries publicly condemning Israel’s strike yet taking almost no tangible steps to back their words—a typical case of hypocrisy on global arena. Condemning Israel, still, better than nothing as it further isolates it. The summit underscored a wider truth: in the Gulf and across the Arab-Islamic world, outrage is often performative, deterrence is limited, and soft power—exercised with discretion, as in Qatar’s case—remains the most effective currency of influence.